

Resolving Legal Ambiguities: What Can Psycholinguistics Tell Us?



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
Manav Mehta

Biochemistry Program
Northeastern University

- I. Introduction
- II. Research Question
- III. Experiments
- IV. Discussion & Conclusions
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I. Introduction




I. Introduction



I. Introduction

PP has **wide scope**




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
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I. Introduction

PP has **wide scope**



PP has **narrow scope**




Lockhart v. US (2016)

“prior state convictions for crimes relating to
[aggravated sexual abuse], [sexual abuse], or [abusive sexual conduct]
involving a minor or ward.”


Lockhart v. US (2016)

wide scope



Lockhart v. US (2016)

narrow scope



Lockhart v. US (2016)

The Majority Opinion: **narrow scope**

“prior state convictions for crimes relating to
[aggravated sexual abuse], [sexual abuse], or [abusive sexual conduct]
involving a minor or ward.”



Justice Sonia Sotomayor

“[a defensive catcher],
[a quick-footed shortstop],
or [a pitcher]

***from last year's World Champion
Kansas City Royals ”***

Lockhart v. US (2016)

The Majority Opinion: **narrow scope**

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Lockhart v. US (2016)

Justice Kagan's dissent: **Wide scope**

“prior state convictions for crimes relating to
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Justice Kagan's dissent: **Wide scope**

“prior state convictions for crimes relating to
[aggravated sexual abuse], [sexual abuse], or [abusive sexual conduct]
involving a minor or ward.”

“a straightforward, parallel construction of nouns in a series”

Lockhart v. US (2016)

Justice Kagan's dissent: **Wide scope**

“prior state convictions for crimes relating to
[aggravated sexual abuse], [sexual abuse], or [abusive sexual conduct]
involving a minor or ward.”

“a [house], [condo], or [apartment]
in New York”



Canons of Construction


“rules of thumb” for how to interpret ambiguous phrases

I. Introduction

Canons of Construction

“rules of thumb” for how to interpret ambiguous phrases

The Series Qualifier Canon:
apply the modifier to the entire **series**




I. Introduction


Canons of Construction

“rules of thumb” for how to interpret ambiguous phrases

The Series Qualifier Canon:
apply the modifier to the entire **series**



The Last Antecedent Rule:
apply the modifier to the **last element**



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
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I. Introduction

The Series Qualifier Canon

vs.



The Last Antecedent Rule



*Karl Llewellyn,
legal scholar (1950)*

I. Introduction

The Series Qualifier Canon
vs.
The Last Antecedent Rule



*Karl Llewellyn,
legal scholar (1950)*

I. Introduction

“the completely ordinary way that people speak and listen, write and read”

Justice Elena Kagan



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How do people interpret ambiguous PP modifiers?

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(1) is there a “**natural**” **preference** for wide or narrow scope?

How do people interpret ambiguous PP modifiers?


- (1) is there a “**natural**” **preference** for wide or narrow scope?
- (2) can the preference could be influenced by **semantics**?

How do people interpret ambiguous PP modifiers?


- (1) is there a “**natural**” **preference** for wide or narrow scope?
- (2) can the preference could be influenced by **semantics**?
- (3) or limited by **syntactic constraints**?

Cars and trucks [with permits] are allowed.

wide scope



narrow scope





Is there a preference for wide scope or narrow scope?

Is there a preference for wide scope or narrow scope?

→ studies in the literature on **related** constructions suggest that **wide scope is preferred.**

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.



Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

But consider this:


Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

But consider this:


Cars and trucks **[with trailers]** are allowed.

II. Research Questions

wide scope



narrow scope




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
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II. Research Questions

wide scope



narrow scope



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Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

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Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

and there's one more thing...

Cars and **trucks** **[with trailers]** are allowed.

II. Research Questions


Cars and **trucks** [with trailers] are allowed.

A diagram consisting of two curved arrows forming a circle. The top arrow points from the word 'trucks' to the word 'Cars', and the bottom arrow points from 'Cars' to 'trucks', indicating a reciprocal relationship or ambiguity between the two terms.

Trucks and cars **[with trailers]** are allowed.

II. Research Questions

narrow scope





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II. Research Questions

narrow scope




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
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II. Research Questions

narrow scope



syntax violation




Resolving Legal Ambiguities: what can psycholinguistics tell us?


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II. Research Questions

narrow scope



wide scope



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Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

Hypothesis 3: Syntax will override semantic bias

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Experiment 1

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

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Hypothesis 3: Syntax will override semantic bias

Experiment 1

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Experiment 1

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

(1)  **Cars and trucks** [with **permits**] are allowed.

Experiment 1

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

(1) **Cars and trucks** [with **permits**] are allowed.

unbiased

Experiment 1

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

unbiased

(1)  **Cars** and **trucks** [with **permits**] are allowed.

Experiment 1

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.


Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

- (1) **Cars** and **trucks** [with **permits**] are allowed. **unbiased**
- (2) Cars and **trucks** [with **trailers**] are allowed.
-

Experiment 1

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

- (1) **Cars** and **trucks** [with **permits**] are allowed. **unbiased**
- (2) Cars and **trucks** [with **trailers**] are allowed. **biased**
- 

Experiment 1

Subjects: 63 US citizens over 18

Experiment 1

Subjects: 63 US citizens over 18
Recruited via Lucid, to match the US population

Experiment 1

Subjects: 63 US citizens over 18
Recruited via Lucid to match the US population

Tool: Online survey

- 12 test sentences
- 12 distractor sentences
- a multiple-choice question followed each sentence

Experiment 1

Test sentence:

Athletes and photographers with their gear waited by the van.

Who had their gear?

- The athletes
- The photographers
- The athletes and the photographers
- None of the above

Experiment 1

Test sentence:

unbiased



Athletes and photographers with their gear waited by the van.

Who had their gear?

- The athletes
- The photographers
- The athletes and the photographers
- None of the above

Experiment 1

Test sentence:

biased

Athletes and photographers with their cameras waited by the van.




Who had their cameras?

- The athletes
- The photographers
- The athletes and the photographers
- None of the above

Experiment 1

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences




Experiment 1

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

- Wide-scope preference in **unbiased** sentences: **89.4%**
- Wide-scope preference in **biased** sentences: **77.8%**



Experiment 1

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

Hypothesis 3: Syntax will override semantic bias

Experiment 1

- ✓ **Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.**
- ✓ **Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences**
- Hypothesis 3: Syntax will override semantic bias

Experiment 2

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

Hypothesis 3: Syntax will override semantic bias

Experiment 2

(2) Cars and **trucks** [with **trailers**] are allowed.


A diagram consisting of two curved arrows forming a cycle. The top arrow starts above the word 'trucks' and points to the word 'trailers'. The bottom arrow starts below the word 'trailers' and points back to the word 'trucks'.

Experiment 2

(4) **Trucks** and cars [with **trailers**] are allowed.

A diagram consisting of two curved arrows forming a circle. The top arrow points from 'Trucks' to 'trailers', and the bottom arrow points from 'trailers' back to 'Trucks', indicating a reciprocal relationship between the two terms.

syntax violation



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Experiment 2

- (1) Cars and trucks [with permits] are allowed.
- (2) Cars and **trucks** [with **trailers**] are allowed.

- (4) **Trucks** and cars [with **trailers**] are allowed.

Experiment 2

- (1) Cars and trucks [with permits] are allowed.
- (2) Cars and **trucks** [with **trailers**] are allowed.
- (3) Trucks and cars [with permits] are allowed.
- (4) **Trucks** and cars [with **trailers**] are allowed.

Experiment 2

unbiased

(3) Trucks and cars [with permits] are allowed.

(4) Trucks and cars [with trailers] are allowed.

biased, but...

Experiment 2

Test sentence:

unbiased



Photographers and athletes with their gear waited by the van.

Who had their gear?

- The athletes
- The photographers
- The athletes and the photographers
- None of the above

Experiment 2

Test sentence:

biased

Photographers and athletes with their cameras waited by the van.



Who had their cameras?

- The photographers
- The athletes
- The photographers and the athletes
- None of the above

Experiment 2

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.


Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

Hypothesis 3: Syntax will override semantic bias

Experiment 2

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 3: Syntax will override semantic bias




Experiment 2

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 3: Syntax will override semantic bias

- Wide-scope preference in **unbiased** sentences: **89.3%**
- Wide-scope preference in **biased** sentences: **90.3%**



Experiment 2

- ✓ **Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.**
- ✓ Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences
- ✓ **Hypothesis 3: Syntax will override semantic bias**

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How do people interpret ambiguous PP modifiers?

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.

Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

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
IV. Discussion and Conclusions

Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.


Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences

Hypothesis 3: Syntax will override semantic bias

Experiment 1: Rates of wide- & narrow-scope interpretations for unbiased & biased PPs



Experiment 2: Rates of wide-scope & illegal attachment interpretations for unbiased & biased PPs



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Experiments 1&2

- ✓ **Hypothesis 1: Wide scope is preferred.**
- ✓ **Hypothesis 2: Semantic bias can weaken scope preferences**
- ✓ **Hypothesis 3: Syntax will override semantic bias**

What does this all mean?

- For lists of nouns, people generally prefer wide-scope readings over narrow-scope.

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- Semantics **can** override this wide-scope preference.

- For lists of nouns, people generally prefer wide-scope readings over narrow-scope.
- Semantics **can** override this wide-scope preference.
- **BUT:** Semantics **cannot** override syntax.

What does this mean for **Lockhart v. US (2016)**?

“prior state convictions for crimes relating to [aggravated sexual abuse], [sexual abuse], or [abusive sexual conduct] ***involving a minor or ward.***”



**narrow
scope!**

**wide
scope!**



What does this mean for **Lockhart v. US (2016)**?

“prior state convictions for crimes relating to [aggravated sexual abuse], [sexual abuse], or [abusive sexual conduct] ***involving a minor or ward.***”

**wide
scope!**



Have there been legal cases where a **narrow-scope** reading is justified?

Have there been legal cases where a **narrow-scope** reading is justified?

yes.

Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)



Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)

The school board can fire any employee with a conviction

*“of a felony or of any crime
[involving moral turpitude]”*



Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)

The school board can fire any employee with a conviction

*“of a felony or of any crime
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Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)

The school board can fire any employee with a conviction


**“of a felony or of any crime
[involving moral turpitude]”**



Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)

The school board can fire any employee with a conviction

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Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)

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
*“of a felony or **of any crime**
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Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)


The school board can fire any employee with a conviction

“of a felony or **of any crime** [involving moral turpitude]”





← narrow scope


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

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Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)

The school board can fire any employee with a conviction


“of a felony or of any crime [involving moral turpitude]”



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
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
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
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
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
Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)

The school board can fire any employee with a conviction

“of a felony or of any crime [involving moral turpitude]”



Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)




Have there been cases where a **narrow-scope** reading is justified?


Have there been cases where a
narrow-scope reading is justified?

yes.

IV. Discussion and Conclusions



IV. Discussion and Conclusions



The Series Qualifier Canon
vs.
The Last Antecedent Rule

IV. Discussion and Conclusions

“the completely ordinary way that people speak and listen, write and read”

Justice Elena Kagan



I. Introduction



- I. Introduction
- II. Research Question
- III. Experiments
- IV. Discussion & Conclusions
- V. References**

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And now back to Larry

The End

Thank you.